Nearly a half-century in history: Somalia's Road to the Popular Vote
Introduction
Somalia gained independence from two European colonies in 1960: Italy from the south and
centeral, and the United Kingdom from the north. Because of the diverse
approaches and strategies implemented by the colonies, the two parts of the
country acquired different experiences and expertise. Fortunately, the
protectorates of the North and South came together to form a fully republican
Somali government that represents all Somalis, with the exception of the
Eastern and Western territories, which the British colonial handed over to
Ethiopia and Kenya, respectively.
Furthermore, the first
formal Somali republic government was established, led by Aden Abdulle Osman,
Peace be upon him. Former Somali Youth League SYL member who had a senior
position in the organization that fought for independence. Aden attracted the
Somali public's attention and won the leadership of the new Somalia through a
democratic process on July 1, 1960. He was successful in uniting both British
and Italian protectorates. The first popular party-based elections were held
after 7 years. The presidency of the Second Post-Independence Government was
won by Abdi Rashid Ali Sharmaarke. Sharmarkle was a previous prime minister of
Aden Abdulle's administration.
However, having popular
democratic elections was a significant success for Somalis at the time.
Unfortunately, the newborn democracy was uprooted two years later, on 7 October
1969, when President Abdirashid was shot and killed in a clan conspiracy while
on a tour to areas in Somalia. This was a tragic day for the Somali government
and people. A week later, on 21 October 1969, the country was taken over by
military top officials in a bloodless coup and controlled for 21 years,
followed by 30 years of political chaos and civil conflict.
Nevertheless, 55 years
later, from 1967 until 2022, Somalis did not have the right to vote or pick
their political representatives. However, two successive administrations fought
for and included one-person vote elections in respective policy strategies, but
this did not occur. Somalis are eagerly awaiting the present administration,
which was recently elected, to carry out its political programs, campaign
promises, and objectives, which include holding a popular vote and granting the
people their constitutional right to vote for whoever they wish.
What are the greatest
challenges to realizing the mandated national goal of the Popular Vote?
The most crucial issue to
be answered is whether the current administration has any chance of overcoming
the obstacles to holding a free and fair public vote. The challenges involved
with these tasks to conduct popular voting can be classified as political,
financial, technical, and security challenges.
Security Challenges,
for over 20 years, Somalia has been ravaged by terror groups attempting to
establish an Islamic state from their perspective, carrying out bombings and
explosive operations while also targeting government officials and civilians.
This group's goal is to govern and rule Somalia. The AS is the main outstanding
security challenge, they are existing in the major cities controlled by the
government and execute operations. They control vast areas in the southern &
central parts of Somalia, some parts of Galgaduud, Hiran, Middle Shabelle,
Lower Shabelle, Bay and Bakool regions, the whole of Middle Jubba, and some parts
of the lower Jubba. These areas are directly under their control but again they
have access to and capable of executing operations including hit-and-run
attacks and VIED car explosions in the government areas which has been created
fear in society.
It would be impossible to
hold popular votes in places under their control. Not only that, but they may
threaten residents in government-controlled regions with not voting at polling
places. This may be solved in order to boost the number and competence of
Somali undercover and intelligence professionals. Furthermore, the AS
governs extensive portions of southern and central Somalia. This can only be
addressed by establishing a direct fight strategy to reduce their presence near
major cities; this can have two significant positive effects; the first is to
restore and liberate areas under AS control, while the second is to increase
the government's control territories. Second, this halts their
preparations for the terror operation in other places.
Completion of the
Provisional Constitution
Somalia cannot have a
popular vote unless the Somali interim constitutions are finalized and a
referendum vote is held. The Somali provisional constitutional document is the
cornerstone of Somalia's state and institutional building. The initial draft of
the document was completed 16 years ago. The document was drafted in 2012,
after over ten million dollars were spent on the first preliminary document.
However, after 10 years, its first draft was only examined in two phases. The
technical and linguistic style literature and phrasing system were reviewed
initially.
The second review, which
is still ongoing, intended to create political agreement-based articles on the
status of Mogadishu, the Somaliland problem, resource and income sharing, and
tax harmonization. The majority of articles on fiscal federalism reflect the
country's federal structure. Fiscal federalism is described as the financial
relationships between federal government elements; states, provinces, and
districts down to the village level. Fiscal federalism is concerned with the
separation of governmental activities and the financial relationships between
levels of government. It is associated with income redistribution, effective
and efficient resource allocation, and economic stability.
The establishment of the Constitutional
Court
The Constitutional Court
is the court as the highest court responsible for the interpretation,
protection, and enforcement of constitutional legislation. It also focuses on
constitutional issues; the cases included raise concerns regarding the
implementation or interpretation of the constitution. The establishment of this
organization is critical for the explanation and jurisdiction of political
issues and election judgments. However, it is critical to guide the
institutional Juris experts in a manner that is free of political and economic
motivations; they must be autonomous of their jurisdictional judgments and
financial ability.
National Identification System
& National statistics
Since the fall of
Somalia's central government in 1991, the country's national identity system
and demographic data have been lost. Somalis do not have personal identity
cards that are registered in the official database. Furthermore, no official
precise and trustworthy statistical record of the Somali population exists. It
has, however, established the National Institute of Statistics and the National
ID Authority.
There are challenges to
the establishment of a national identification system that we must consider in
order to develop a successful national identification system.
·
Exclusion, In the Somali context, where
Somalis formerly adopted informal techniques to demonstrate their identity. The
formalization and establishment of a new system of identifying plays a
significant role in people's lives, such as access to social assistance
programs qualified on specific IDs. It is crucial to ensure the inclusion of
all society types, particularly marginalized communities. For example, failure
of biometric system verification mechanisms, collecting information and data
that may be difficult for some people to provide, and poor data quality can
result in people being excluded from the ID system.
·
Privacy and security violations.
It is crucial in the collection, storage, and use of sensitive personal data
are risks related to privacy violations, data theft and misuse, identity fraud,
and discrimination. ID systems require solid legal and regulatory procedures as
well as a privacy-and-security-protective design approach to alleviate these
risks and ensure data protection and user control. Cybersecurity of the system
inside a secure environment should be built in from the start.
·
Vendor or technology lock-in. Dependence
on a certain technology or provider can result in "lock-in" and/or
dependency, which raises costs and restricts the system's flexibility to meet
the demands of the country as it advances. For example, in the
·
adoption of technology with a restricted number
of suppliers, or contractual terms in supply contracts or license agreements
(e.g., for software).
· Insufficient
national cybersecurity capacity. Somalia's national cybersecurity
system has capacity gaps, which are required to provide a safe enabling
environment for digital ID systems. Inadequate threat information, broken
monitoring and emergency response, software platforms, too few or inadequately
experienced cybersecurity analysts, poor cybercrime and cybersecurity laws, and
poor cyber prosecution are all examples of gaps. The central cybersecurity
agency's capabilities for appropriately supporting digital ID programs must be
reviewed.
Political Commitment.
Overcoming these problems
requires only the political commitments of the leadership; without their
commitment, nothing of the popular vote aim can be realized. However, the
administration must begin organizing any policies and regulations, as well as
mobilizing and arranging any available resources, that are related to the
finalization of the constitution, legislation and documentation of election
policies, adapting fiscal federalism issues resource sharing among states and
tax harmonization, public financial management system, distribution development
projects criteria among states and hierarchal Judicial system, state, province,
and dispensation those critical issues in developing a trustworthy electoral
process
Financial and technical
Issues.
The federal government of
Somalia's financial budget cannot cover all costs of corresponding ballot
activities. However, international partners agreed to provide 40% of the eligible
expenditures. While the remainder of the election expenditures is distributed
to domestic income and the national budget. The UN mission in Somalia assists
in the technical capacity building of technocrat staff in the National
Independent Election Commission. This technical support might be useful in the
day-to-day task activities of the election process timetable. The election
process starts with the planning, budgeting, and implementation of the
proclaiming election results.
In conclusion
Somalis have not had any opportunity to use their right to vote and
pick their preferred candidates; now is the moment for them to do so. However,
there have been challenges that must be overcome with attention and commitment.
These constraints can only be addressed with the present administration's
political will. International donors, agencies, and implementation
organizations in Somalia, led by UN and AU representatives' offices, are ready
to provide technical and financial assistance to ensure free and fair
elections. To overcome the hurdles and achieve the national goal of one person,
one vote elections, the Somali government should develop a strategic plan with
a timeframe and benchmarks.
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