Nearly a half-century in history: Somalia's Road to the Popular Vote


Introduction

Somalia gained independence from two European colonies in 1960: Italy from the south and centeral, and the United Kingdom from the north. Because of the diverse approaches and strategies implemented by the colonies, the two parts of the country acquired different experiences and expertise. Fortunately, the protectorates of the North and South came together to form a fully republican Somali government that represents all Somalis, with the exception of the Eastern and Western territories, which the British colonial handed over to Ethiopia and Kenya, respectively.

Furthermore, the first formal Somali republic government was established, led by Aden Abdulle Osman, Peace be upon him. Former Somali Youth League SYL member who had a senior position in the organization that fought for independence. Aden attracted the Somali public's attention and won the leadership of the new Somalia through a democratic process on July 1, 1960. He was successful in uniting both British and Italian protectorates. The first popular party-based elections were held after 7 years. The presidency of the Second Post-Independence Government was won by Abdi Rashid Ali Sharmaarke. Sharmarkle was a previous prime minister of Aden Abdulle's administration.

However, having popular democratic elections was a significant success for Somalis at the time. Unfortunately, the newborn democracy was uprooted two years later, on 7 October 1969, when President Abdirashid was shot and killed in a clan conspiracy while on a tour to areas in Somalia. This was a tragic day for the Somali government and people. A week later, on 21 October 1969, the country was taken over by military top officials in a bloodless coup and controlled for 21 years, followed by 30 years of political chaos and civil conflict.

 

Nevertheless, 55 years later, from 1967 until 2022, Somalis did not have the right to vote or pick their political representatives. However, two successive administrations fought for and included one-person vote elections in respective policy strategies, but this did not occur. Somalis are eagerly awaiting the present administration, which was recently elected, to carry out its political programs, campaign promises, and objectives, which include holding a popular vote and granting the people their constitutional right to vote for whoever they wish.

 

 

 

 

What are the greatest challenges to realizing the mandated national goal of the Popular Vote?

The most crucial issue to be answered is whether the current administration has any chance of overcoming the obstacles to holding a free and fair public vote. The challenges involved with these tasks to conduct popular voting can be classified as political, financial, technical, and security challenges.

Security Challenges, for over 20 years, Somalia has been ravaged by terror groups attempting to establish an Islamic state from their perspective, carrying out bombings and explosive operations while also targeting government officials and civilians. This group's goal is to govern and rule Somalia. The AS is the main outstanding security challenge, they are existing in the major cities controlled by the government and execute operations. They control vast areas in the southern & central parts of Somalia, some parts of Galgaduud, Hiran, Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle, Bay and Bakool regions, the whole of Middle Jubba, and some parts of the lower Jubba. These areas are directly under their control but again they have access to and capable of executing operations including hit-and-run attacks and VIED car explosions in the government areas which has been created fear in society.

It would be impossible to hold popular votes in places under their control. Not only that, but they may threaten residents in government-controlled regions with not voting at polling places. This may be solved in order to boost the number and competence of Somali undercover and intelligence professionals. Furthermore, the AS governs extensive portions of southern and central Somalia. This can only be addressed by establishing a direct fight strategy to reduce their presence near major cities; this can have two significant positive effects; the first is to restore and liberate areas under AS control, while the second is to increase the government's control territories. Second, this halts their preparations for the terror operation in other places.

Completion of the Provisional Constitution

Somalia cannot have a popular vote unless the Somali interim constitutions are finalized and a referendum vote is held. The Somali provisional constitutional document is the cornerstone of Somalia's state and institutional building. The initial draft of the document was completed 16 years ago. The document was drafted in 2012, after over ten million dollars were spent on the first preliminary document. However, after 10 years, its first draft was only examined in two phases. The technical and linguistic style literature and phrasing system were reviewed initially.

The second review, which is still ongoing, intended to create political agreement-based articles on the status of Mogadishu, the Somaliland problem, resource and income sharing, and tax harmonization. The majority of articles on fiscal federalism reflect the country's federal structure. Fiscal federalism is described as the financial relationships between federal government elements; states, provinces, and districts down to the village level. Fiscal federalism is concerned with the separation of governmental activities and the financial relationships between levels of government. It is associated with income redistribution, effective and efficient resource allocation, and economic stability.

The establishment of the Constitutional Court

The Constitutional Court is the court as the highest court responsible for the interpretation, protection, and enforcement of constitutional legislation. It also focuses on constitutional issues; the cases included raise concerns regarding the implementation or interpretation of the constitution. The establishment of this organization is critical for the explanation and jurisdiction of political issues and election judgments. However, it is critical to guide the institutional Juris experts in a manner that is free of political and economic motivations; they must be autonomous of their jurisdictional judgments and financial ability.

National Identification System & National statistics

Since the fall of Somalia's central government in 1991, the country's national identity system and demographic data have been lost. Somalis do not have personal identity cards that are registered in the official database. Furthermore, no official precise and trustworthy statistical record of the Somali population exists. It has, however, established the National Institute of Statistics and the National ID Authority.

There are challenges to the establishment of a national identification system that we must consider in order to develop a successful national identification system.

·       Exclusion, In the Somali context, where Somalis formerly adopted informal techniques to demonstrate their identity. The formalization and establishment of a new system of identifying plays a significant role in people's lives, such as access to social assistance programs qualified on specific IDs. It is crucial to ensure the inclusion of all society types, particularly marginalized communities. For example, failure of biometric system verification mechanisms, collecting information and data that may be difficult for some people to provide, and poor data quality can result in people being excluded from the ID system.

·       Privacy and security violations.  It is crucial in the collection, storage, and use of sensitive personal data are risks related to privacy violations, data theft and misuse, identity fraud, and discrimination. ID systems require solid legal and regulatory procedures as well as a privacy-and-security-protective design approach to alleviate these risks and ensure data protection and user control. Cybersecurity of the system inside a secure environment should be built in from the start.

·       Vendor or technology lock-in. Dependence on a certain technology or provider can result in "lock-in" and/or dependency, which raises costs and restricts the system's flexibility to meet the demands of the country as it advances. For example, in the

·       adoption of technology with a restricted number of suppliers, or contractual terms in supply contracts or license agreements (e.g., for software).

·       Insufficient national cybersecurity capacity. Somalia's national cybersecurity system has capacity gaps, which are required to provide a safe enabling environment for digital ID systems. Inadequate threat information, broken monitoring and emergency response, software platforms, too few or inadequately experienced cybersecurity analysts, poor cybercrime and cybersecurity laws, and poor cyber prosecution are all examples of gaps. The central cybersecurity agency's capabilities for appropriately supporting digital ID programs must be reviewed.

Political Commitment.

Overcoming these problems requires only the political commitments of the leadership; without their commitment, nothing of the popular vote aim can be realized. However, the administration must begin organizing any policies and regulations, as well as mobilizing and arranging any available resources, that are related to the finalization of the constitution, legislation and documentation of election policies, adapting fiscal federalism issues resource sharing among states and tax harmonization, public financial management system, distribution development projects criteria among states and hierarchal Judicial system, state, province, and dispensation those critical issues in developing a trustworthy electoral process

Financial and technical Issues.

The federal government of Somalia's financial budget cannot cover all costs of corresponding ballot activities. However, international partners agreed to provide 40% of the eligible expenditures. While the remainder of the election expenditures is distributed to domestic income and the national budget. The UN mission in Somalia assists in the technical capacity building of technocrat staff in the National Independent Election Commission. This technical support might be useful in the day-to-day task activities of the election process timetable. The election process starts with the planning, budgeting, and implementation of the proclaiming election results.

In conclusion

Somalis have not had any opportunity to use their right to vote and pick their preferred candidates; now is the moment for them to do so. However, there have been challenges that must be overcome with attention and commitment. These constraints can only be addressed with the present administration's political will. International donors, agencies, and implementation organizations in Somalia, led by UN and AU representatives' offices, are ready to provide technical and financial assistance to ensure free and fair elections. To overcome the hurdles and achieve the national goal of one person, one vote elections, the Somali government should develop a strategic plan with a timeframe and benchmarks.

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